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Abstract 
This work examines in depth the hypotheses explaining the tax capacity of regional 
governments, also determining their tax effort and explanatory factors. The study is done for 
the Spanish regions, using different techniques which have rarely been applied in this area. 
The results show that these jurisdictions have exercised their tax autonomy responsibly, in 
response to different budget and demographic factors and to the economic cycle. Also, an 
asymmetrical tax behaviour linked to income is observed: some regions have practically 
exhausted the possibilities of current sub-central taxes, while others still have ample fiscal 
space.  
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1 Introduction 
Historically, the study of tax effort at the sub-central level has related mainly to two issues. On 
one hand, the main subject of analysis in barely decentralised governments is the high degree of 
financial dependence on transfers from the central government, and the pernicious effects of the 
lack of fiscal accountability, as seen in Spain in the first two decades of the regional 
decentralisation model. On the other, the literature associated with equalisation transfers mainly 
studies the analysis and construction of indicators of tax need and potential tax revenue, but not 
tax effort, even though this is an indicator sometimes considered in the formulas determining 
the amount of these transfers, as happened explicitly in the first stages of the Spanish regional 
financing model. We see, therefore, that the international literature rarely quantifies the real 
exercise of fiscal accountability at the sub-central level, unlike the high level of attention to this 
matter for central governments, and only occasionally does it propose to determine the real 
causes explaining the degree to which this sub-central tax autonomy is exercised.  
In fact, as tax decentralisation progresses and important taxes are assigned to regional 
governments, giving them greater regulatory power over essential elements of those taxes (e.g., 
tax credits and tax rates), ever-larger differences are created between both tax rate levels and the 
configuration of many of these taxes. This process of increasing territorial differentiation in tax 
matters is concerning: it can mean a considerable increase in the costs of tax collection and tax 
compliance, it facilitates competition to attract mobile tax bases, it makes the tax differences 
between territories less transparent, and it makes it more difficult to calculate theoretical tax 
revenue and tax effort, and thus the necessary equalisation transfers. These concerns are also 
present in Spain, as the Informe de la Comisión de Expertos para la Revisión del Modelo de 
Financiación Autonómica (2017) warned. 
Alongside this, in the current context of mutual reproaches between levels of government, 
caused by budget imbalances and the strict financial restrictions associated with the effects of 
the economic crisis, examining regional tax behaviour will let us test the veracity of the claims 
of this level of government to be the victim, or the central government’s accusations of a lack of 
regional fiscal accountability, an aspect which is also present in the Spanish case, with 
accusations of financial disloyalty flying between these levels of government. 
For this reason, the goal of this work is to quantify the use regional governments make of 
their potential tax capacity, that is to say, the tax effort, and examine the causes explaining their 
tax effort, based on an empirical exercise for the Spanish regions during the period 2002–2012. 
This work presents several methodological peculiarities differentiating it from the emerging 
international literature on tax effort at the sub-central level. First, we use several frontier 
methods, some of which have rarely been applied in this field. Second, we extend the 
explanatory hypotheses of potential tax revenue, by combining general indicators with other 
specific indicators of tax capacity. And finally, we use a temporal approach with panel data 
considering total tax revenue, rather than the cross-section estimates more often found in this 
type of study, or the partial works which consider only one tax. 
The work is structured as follows. In the next section, we define the concept of tax effort, 
and review the available literature on the subject and the different methodologies applied in its 
study. In the third section, we briefly explain the Spanish regional funding system which is the 
subject of our study. In the fourth section, we propose explanatory hypotheses for the tax 
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potential (or tax capacity) and tax effort of those regions. The fifth section presents the estimates 
and calculations of tax effort and its determinants. The results show that the Spanish regions 
have exerted a strong tax effort, and that in general, they do not have much room to manoeuvre 
to raise tax revenues, although we find significant asymmetry placing some regions at the limits 
of their potential tax income, while others still have considerable fiscal space. The work 
concludes with a section of final thoughts. 
2 Review of the literature on tax effort 
The concept of tax effort is subjective and hard to evaluate, as it is not directly observable. This 
is attested by the fact that several approaches to it have been suggested in the literature, but none 
has been universally accepted as satisfactory. The most widely recognised tendency in the 
literature considers tax effort to be the degree to which a jurisdiction effectively uses its tax 
capacity. In other words, it can be expressed as the quotient between the real tax revenue 
obtained by a jurisdiction and its potential tax revenue or tax capacity. The tax capacity of a 
jurisdiction can be defined as the volume of tax resources which a government can obtain when 
making full use of its regulatory power over the taxes within its reach, with effective 
management of them (legal tax capacity). However, an economic approach is normally used, 
which determines the maximum tax revenue a jurisdiction can obtain given its economic, social, 
institutional, and demographic characteristics (economic tax capacity).1  
In this way, mathematically, the numerator of the tax effort (the exercised tax capacity or 
real revenue collected) depends on the action of the government, as higher tax rates, or more 
intense efforts in tax management and inspection leading to lower tax evasion, raise the 
effective tax collected. Meanwhile, the denominator of the tax effort would correspond to the 
potential tax resources which a government could obtain using the tax bases available to it (tax 
capacity). This denominator would be independent of the action of the government (Martínez-
Vázquez and Boex, 1997), and as it is unobservable, this figure is difficult to quantify. The 
goodness of the tax effort indicator would thus depend on the quality of the measurement of the 
denominator (or tax capacity). 
In practice, various ways have been put forward to measure this tax capacity or denominator 
of tax effort. This has sometimes been done through macroeconomic indicators such as the 
income or wealth of the territory, which is a straightforward and inexpensive option. 
Unfortunately, this method may not reflect the true capacity of sub-central governments to 
obtain resources through their own taxes, and may not capture the uneven distribution of 
specific tax bases, such as those linked to mineral resources, for example.2 An alternative 
method to approximating tax capacity is the Representative Revenue System (Advisory 
_________________________ 
1 The theoretical aspects of the tax capacity and tax effort concepts can be reviewed in Frank (1959), ACIR (1988), 
Gold (1986), Kincaid (1989), Bird and Slack (1990), Dahlby and Wilson (1994), and Cyan, Martínez-Vázquez and 
Vulovic (2014). 
2 Mikesell (2007) and Costa (2008) conduct an exhaustive review of the advantages and disadvantages of each 
method of estimating tax capacity. 
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Commission on Intergovernmental Relations-ACIR, 1988). This method calculates the potential 
revenue governments would obtain from their own taxes if they applied a standard tax rate 
(López-Casanovas and Castellanos, 2002; López-Laborda, 2015) to the different tax bases 
available to them, managing the taxes with a standard efficiency level. This line would be 
followed by Hy et al. (1993) and Yilmaz et al. (2002) and more recently by the proposal of De 
la Fuente (2013), who applies the average tax rate imposed by the set of regions. Although the 
Representative Revenue System has significant theoretical advantages, it has the disadvantage 
that the regional tax bases are not always available, making it necessary in many cases to resort 
to proxies of those tax bases, with varying success, depending on the information available in 
each case. This in turn means making subjective decisions in the process of evaluating the 
different types of taxes. Another disadvantage is that if the decentralised tax bases are not 
closely linked to regional income, resources may be transferred from low-income regions to rich 
ones through equalisation grants.3 And depending on the standard tax rate used, it can lead to a 
certain instability in the revenues of sub-central governments by incentivising strategic 
behaviour, such as setting sub-optimal tax rates (Herrero and Martínez-Vázquez, 2007; López-
Laborda, 2015).  
Nevertheless, the econometric method has been the most popular for empirical studies of tax 
capacity. This is an indirect method used to estimate tax capacity based on regressions of 
observed tax revenue according to objective, non-manipulable indicators, used as proxies for the 
tax bases. The first econometric applications used the least squares analysis (OLS) to estimate 
the average tax capacity of a jurisdiction, given its tax bases, economic structure, institutional 
aspects, and demographic trends. More recently, a novel methodology based on the stochastic 
frontier of production possibilities, proposed by Aigner et al. (1977), has begun to come into 
use. This methodology applies maximum likelihood techniques to estimate a stochastic tax 
frontier, as it is understood to provide a better fit for the potential tax capacity of a jurisdiction 
than the average behaviour provided by the OLS approach. In this way, the tax capacity of a 
jurisdiction will be considered as the maximum revenue level it could obtain with a virtuous use 
of its tax bases and efficient management of its taxes, taking as a benchmark the best results 
reached by the set of jurisdictions with similar conditions over the whole period considered.  
The literature includes various papers which calculate tax effort based on tax capacity 
measured with one or other of these techniques. First, Frank’s (1959) index is a pioneering 
example of the school of thought which uses a macroeconomic approximation of tax capacity as 
the basis for calculating tax effort. This index defines tax effort as the quotient between the 
fiscal pressure of the jurisdiction and its per capita income (macroeconomic indicator of the tax 
capacity), but as tax pressure is the proportion of national income collected in taxes, 
mathematically Frank’s Index is transformed into the quotient between per capita collection and 
the square of per capita income. This means that the drawback of this index is that it shows 
excessively high values in low-income territories, even if their citizens pay low taxes. An 
application of this index for local governments in Spain can be reviewed in Cordero et al. 
(2010). 
_________________________ 
3 Insofar as the tax bases of the taxes reflect patterns of consumption or use of resources by the regions, rather than 
their available resources or purchasing power, these may not be valid factors for calculating their tax capacity, as they 
actually reflect the economic decisions of the citizens (Barro, 1986, and Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler, 2008). 
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Second, there are notable works by Bahl (1972) and Hy et al. (1993) which estimate tax 
efforts based on tax capacities calculated according to the Representative Revenue System. The 
Relative Tax Effort Indexes of Zabalza and Lasheras (2000) and López-Casasnovas and 
Castellanos (2002) for Spain can also be included in this line of approach. In fact, these Relative 
Tax Effort Indexes are calculated as the quotient between effective collection in each region and 
the expected collection based on standard or joint collection behaviour (or tax capacity). This 
expected collection is obtained by multiplying a theoretical tax rate (which might be the overall 
average rate, the observed rate, or the regulatory rate) by the expected tax base, territorialised 
through variables intended to approximate the tax revenue capacity of each region.  
Third, there are papers which calculate the tax effort by comparing real tax revenue with the 
estimated revenue calculated using econometric methods. With the OLS estimate of tax 
capacity, the error term can be positive or negative, so that the tax effort calculated based on 
that estimate can be over 100%; in other words, a jurisdiction may deviate above or below the 
predicted average. There are many papers using this methodology to study tax effort at the 
national level (from the pioneering Lotz and Morss, 1967, to the recent work of Le et al., 2012); 
however, there are hardly any studies at the sub-central level (Herrero and Martínez-Vázquez, 
2007, and Cordero et al., 2010, for Spain). Instead, the SFA estimate of tax capacity is based on 
the idea that no economic agent can be located beyond the frontier, so that the tax effort 
obtained by comparing real tax revenue with the frontier or the potential revenue estimated with 
stochastic frontier analysis cannot exceed 100%. Thus, any deviation from the frontier 
represents each jurisdiction’s margin for manoeuvre to raise its revenue to the “potential” 
maximum. This methodology has been used in a few studies of tax effort at the central level, 
such as Pessino and Fenochietto (2010), and Cyan et al. (2014); and in the regional-level works 
of Jha et al. (1999), Ramírez and Erquizio (2011), Garg et al. (2017), and even the preliminary 
approximation of Medina (2012) for the Spanish regions. Also relating closely to our research is 
the literature using stochastic frontier techniques to analyse efficiency in the collection of the 
taxes which a jurisdiction has established (Alm and Duncan, 2014). 
Fourth, although to a much more limited extent, other techniques can be found in tax effort 
studies, which although not parametric, share the frontier approach discussed above (in SFA), 
and are frequently found in evaluations of the efficiency of units of production. One of these is 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which has been used to measure the tax effort of 
municipalities in Colombia (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2005) and in several states 
in India (Thirtle et al, 2000, and Rajaraman and Goyal, 2012). Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) is a linear programming technique which facilitates the construction of an enveloping 
surface for calculating a synthetic indicator of relative efficiency. Regions obtaining the 
maximum level of tax revenue from the tax bases they use would be on the frontier, so that the 
tax collecting margin of other regions could be measured by their distance from the frontier. 
This is a technique which lets tax effort be determined without the need to explicitly calculate 
tax capacity. Given that this is a non-parametric method, there is no need to know the functional 
form of the input-output relationship; neither is it a statistical method, so there is no need to set 
a probabilistic distribution of inefficiency.  
Its non-convex version, the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) model, has been less used - as far as 
we know, only Mattos et al. (2011) have used it to measure efficiency in the collection of 
municipal taxes in Brazil. FDH is a special case of DEA, with the distinguishing feature of not 
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requiring convexity, and that the benchmark units for comparison of the collections are real 
decision units, giving meaning to the comparison between decision units. With FDH, a 
jurisdiction which does not exploit its maximum tax-gathering potential will be compared with a 
real jurisdiction which obtains more tax income in similar socioeconomic conditions, rather than 
a virtual one constructed from linear combinations (as in the DEA model).  
Recently, extensions to this methodology have appeared, known as Order-m (Cazals et al., 
2002) and Order-α (Aragon et al., 2005) partial frontier approaches. These approaches do not 
envelop all the data, and although they are beginning to be used in business efficiency studies, 
they have not yet made an impact in the field of fiscal federalism, except for the contribution of 
Vallés-Giménez and Zárate-Marco (2017). These non-parametric partial frontier methods are 
interesting because they permit atypical efficient or super-efficient observations - i.e., beyond 
the estimated tax revenue frontier, making it possible to greatly reduce sensitivity to errors of 
measurement and outliers. Thus, this method can reduce the possible impact on tax revenue 
comparisons of, for example, regions with significant unusual taxation features or with natural 
resources which facilitate high tax revenues. 
To sum up, a comparative review of the literature enables us to conclude that there is ample 
international empirical evidence for calculating tax effort at the national level, although there 
are still few empirical studies of sub-central governments. The problem of the availability of 
applied research is exacerbated by the lack of necessary information in many countries, 
especially for works that consider several years at the same time (panel data). Meanwhile, the 
literature offers a wide range of techniques for calculating tax effort, allowing us to take 
advantage of the merits of each one and check the robustness of the results obtained, while 
being aware of the limitations of each approach. 
3 The Spanish regional funding system 
Our study will consider the set of Spanish regions in the common funding system (therefore 
excluding the Basque Country and Navarre, the two regions with their own special funding 
system), as it presents a series of characteristics making it ideal for analysing these aspects. On 
one hand, in the Spanish regional funding system, jurisdictions have a high degree of tax 
autonomy, which allows for a large enough fiscal space for heterogeneous tax behaviour to 
appear within a common national framework. Each region has the autonomy to establish its own 
taxes and specify certain elements in the assigned taxes (tax rates, tax credits, allowances), so 
the regional tax scenarios vary widely. On the other hand, until 2002 the equalisation transfers 
model for Spanish regions considered their tax effort as one of the factors determining the 
allocation of grants, though the tax effort indicator used was not calculated appropriately.4 Also, 
the aggregate budgetary balance at the regional level masks the coexistence of heavily indebted 
regions (e.g., Catalonia and Valencia) alongside financially sound ones (e.g., Galicia and the 
Canary Islands). This heterogeneity is extremely interesting, because by studying how the 
different Spanish regions have used their tax authority, we can assess whether they are justified 
_________________________ 
4 Since then, tax capacity has been the basis for the regional financing system. 
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in borrowing to mitigate the shortfalls of the regional funding system, or whether the central 
government should intervene to correct the low sub-central tax effort.  
Comparatively, the Spanish regions are among the sub-central jurisdictions with the most 
autonomy to manage their spending and revenue, although historically they have had a smaller 
margin of discretion. They can support their spending policies with transfers from higher levels 
of government through various funds, borrowing (with strict limits), and a plethora of their own 
and assigned taxes. The regions have gradually introduced their own taxes, where they are 
responsible for every aspect of performance, application, and regulation. These are usually 
environmental taxes with low potential revenue, given the restrictions of the Regional Funding 
Act (LOFCA) for establishing taxes on matters already taxed by other levels of government. For 
a detailed list of the tax measures adopted by each region, see the annual reports published by 
the Ministry of Finance and Civil Service (Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública- MHFP). 
In contrast, the taxes whose collection is, totally or partly, assigned by the central 
government to the regions (hereafter, assigned taxes), provide them 90 per cent of their non-
financial revenues, and as shown in Table 1, the regions have a certain degree of regulatory or 
decision-making power over many of those assigned taxes, which they can exercise within 
limits. The regions have more regulatory power over Inheritance Tax (ISD), Estate and Property 
Transfer Tax (ITPAJD), Wealth Tax (IP), Gambling Taxes (TJ), and Personal Income Tax 
(IRPF), only 50% of which is assigned, than over the Special Tax on fuels (IH) and the Tax on 
Certain Forms of Transport (IDMT), where the regions have some power over the tax rate. 
Meanwhile, they have no regulatory power over Value Added Tax (VAT), Special Taxes on the 
manufacture of alcoholic drinks and tobacco, or the Special Tax on electricity (IE). In these 
taxes the regions only have territorialised shares of 50%, 58%, and 100% of revenue, 
respectively. The regions can also set surcharges on certain State taxes. And additionally, as 
shown in the last column of Table 1, they have powers relating to management of the IP, ISD, 
ITPAJD, TJ, IDMT, and the Tax on Retail Sales of Certain Hydrocarbons, included in the IH 
since 2013. 
Thus, the volume of tax revenue in the Spanish regions may be influenced by at least five 
factors. First, regional governments have discretion to set tax rates for the majority of assigned 
taxes. Second, in many cases they also have regulatory power to establish other tax elements, 
such as exemptions, rebates, and tax deductions. Third, the regions manage, monitor and inspect 
taxation, tasks which may affect the total tax base and thus, tax revenue. Fourth, they can use 
techniques which combine the previous three mechanisms, so that if the amount of the tax base 
is increased they can reduce the tax rate applied, or establish more deductions or rebates, for 
example. And finally, they can establish their own taxes, and surcharges on certain other taxes. 
All of this means that the regions have the power to make decisions on approximately one third 
of total regional tax revenue, and that there are sufficient optional elements to give them a 
significant capacity to affect regional taxes. For this reason we think it is important to quantify 
the available or unexploited tax margin within the reach of this level of government.  
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Table 1: Taxes assigned to the Spanish regions, regulatory and management powers* 
TAX ASSIGNED REVENUE REGULATORY POWER 
APPLICATION AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Wealth Tax (IP) 100% Minimum exempt, tax rate, deductions and rebates. Regional  
Inheritance Tax (ISD) 100% Rebates, tax rate, existing assets, deductions and allowances. Regional 
Estate and Property Transfer Tax 
(ITPAJD) 100% 
Tax rate, deductions and rebates 
(except in IOS modality). Regional 
Gambling Taxes (TJ) 100% Exemptions, tax base, tax rates and flat rates, accrued and allowances. Regional 
Personal Income Tax (IRPF)  50% 
Regional tax rate and deductions, 
regional personal and family 
minimum (±10%) 
Central 
Value Added Tax (VAT) 50% No, as required by the EU. Shared tax. 
Central 
Special taxes on alcohol and 
tobacco 58% 
No, as required by the EU. Shared 
tax. 
Central 
Special tax on fuels 58% Regional tax rates. 
Central 
(Tax on retail sales of 
certain fuels: Regional) 
Special tax on electricity 100% No, as required by the EU. Shared tax. 
Central 
Tax on certain forms of transport 
(IDMT) 100% Tax rates (+15%). Regional  
* Non-assigned taxes include Corporate Tax, Non-Resident Income Tax, Carbon Tax, tax on insurance premiums, 
etc. 
 Source: By the authors. 
4 Factors explaining the stochastic tax frontier and tax effort of 
the Spanish regions 
Our study is based on the implementation of the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). The SFA 
is a parametric technique which is increasingly popular around the world in empirical studies 
seeking to know what percent of total tax capacity governments are capturing through their tax 
efforts. To answer this question requires identifying governments’ maximum potential tax 
revenue, and the SFA becomes the most appropriate technique for that purpose, because that is 
what SFA does: it identifies the maximum potential of tax collection, while non-frontier 
analyses only estimate the mean of the tax collection. Moreover, SFA allows us not only to 
determine the level of regional tax effort, but also to identify the factors explaining the different 
levels of tax effort of the regions, estimating them simultaneously with potential or frontier tax 
revenues and their determining factors.  
Statistically, SFA involves specifying a regression model for the tax frontier, with two error 
terms. With an output approach, this could be represented as follows: 
 
 ln TAXit = β0+Σmk=1βk lnxkit + vit - uit [1] 
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019–31) 
www.economics-ejournal.org 10 
 
 
 
 
where TAXit will be the tax revenue for the region i in the year t, with i = 1, 2, …, 15 and t = 
2002, ..., 2012; xkit represents a vector of values corresponding to k relevant variables to explain 
the tax capacity of region i in the year t; βk corresponds to a vector of parameters to be 
estimated; and β0 is the common constant for all the regions in the year t. The error term, vit, 
represents the usual statistical noise, i.e., everything beyond the control of the region, and is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed as a N (0, σv2). The second error term, uit, 
represents the error in obtaining the maximum amount of revenue for given inputs or tax bases, 
and would be the function of variables zit, which may vary over time and would include 
observed heterogeneity. 
  
   uit = δ zit + wit,       [2] 
where δ is a coefficient vector to be estimated and wit is the error term. 
 
Endogenous variable 
We took as endogenous variable (output) the regional tax revenue, TAX, considering all tax 
sources (own and assigned taxes, with and without regulatory power) which may be distributed 
very unevenly among the regions due to uncontrollable external factors, as this is the only way 
to avoid the risks arising from the possible substitutability and interdependence of the different 
forms of obtaining tax revenues by this level of government (ACIR, 1988).5  
 
Factors determining tax potential or tax capacity 
To choose the inputs or explanatory variables of the tax potential, we considered the available 
empirical evidence on central and sub-central tax behaviour, and performed a series of 
regression analyses to select the variables which best measure the tax capacity of the Spanish 
regions, taking always into account that tax capacity is independent of government decisions or 
actions, which excludes the consideration of variables such as tax rate. Specifically, we 
estimated the real revenue collected for each assigned tax and for the total aggregate, according 
to the main macroeconomic regional indicators which can explain that revenue, and 
alternatively, a series of proxies of their respective tax bases (as the territorialised tax base 
information needed to estimate revenue from the taxes considered does not exist).6 Given that 
_________________________ 
5 Although regional governments do not have the power of decision over a given tax, if we do not include the 
revenues derived from its tax base, x, and that tax base were unevenly distributed among the regions, we would be 
undervaluing the real tax capacity of the regions with a relatively large base x, and overvaluing those in the opposite 
situation. 
6 We decided not to include the subject of vertical tax externalities (e.g., Dahlby and Wilson, 2003; Andersson et al, 
2004), given that although in the Spanish case the main tax types are shared between the central and regional levels of 
government (Personal Income Tax, Value Added Tax, and excise taxes are partly assigned), it is really only in 
Personal Income Tax where tax bases with regulatory power for the regions are shared. Also, the fact that Personal 
Income Tax has gradually been decentralised, and that during the initial decentralisation period the regions merely 
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assigned taxes represent approximately 90 per cent of the non-financial revenues of the 
regions,7 the explanatory variables of the assigned taxes will also provide a good explanation of 
the endogenous TAX or total tax revenue. Table A.1 of the Appendix shows the definition of 
each variable used, the source the data were obtained from, and the main descriptive statistics of 
the variables. The matrix of correlations is presented in Table A.2. All the nominal variables 
were deflated according to the corresponding regional price index.  
These estimates can be seen in Table A.3 in the Appendix. The upper part of the table shows 
the estimated revenue (for each assigned tax and for the aggregate) according to the specific tax 
bases, and the lower part shows the results for the general indicators of tax capacity (income and 
population). We took variables in logs. The estimation uses the robust errors method proposed 
by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and adapted by Hoechle (2007). This methodology generates 
robust estimates of tax capacity and can be used when the residuals are nonspherical, and 
without the need for the residuals to be homoscedastic or for absence of serial and contemporary 
correlation. In our case, this is recommended by the Wooldridge, Wald, and Pesarán tests, 
respectively. Other methods which would let us simultaneously eliminate the problems 
mentioned are Parks-Kmenta feasible generalized least squares, and Beck and Katz’s panel 
corrected standard errors, although the former cannot be used when T<N, as in our case, and the 
latter perform better with smaller samples. 
The results of these estimates demonstrate that the two general indicators of tax capacity 
often used in the literature, population (POP) and income (INCOME), provide a fairly 
satisfactory explanation of revenue for most individually considered taxes and for the aggregate; 
although it seems to be necessary to include a specific proxy for the tax bases linked to wealth 
and gambling in order to mitigate the defects shown by general indicators in the individual 
estimation of these taxes (IP and TJ, respectively).  
Thus, as seen in Table 2, to estimate the tax potential or equation [1] of the stochastic 
frontier model, we used as explanatory variables or inputs the two general indicators of tax 
capacity (POP and INCOME), the proxies of the wealth tax base (stock of private capital, 
STOCKP) and the gambling tax base (regional expenditure on gambling, GAMBLINGEXP), 
and different features of the institutional context arising from the heterogeneity of the sample, 
which this technique lets us capture with dummy variables in the tax frontier equation. With the 
dummy variable DPROV, we identify the single-province regions, which enjoy both regional 
and provincial revenues, as they assume the responsibilities of the Provincial Governments; 
with the qualitative variable CAN, we identify the region of the Canary Islands, given the 
unique features of its tax system, associated with its characteristics as an ultra-peripheral region 
of the European Union (article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union); 
and with the trend variable, TEND, we capture the impact of the passage of time on tax revenue 
and the learning effect in the regions, which have seen their tax autonomy increase significantly 
from 2002 (the first year of our sample) when more taxes were assigned in line with Law  
 
_________________________ 
occupied the “fiscal space” vacated by the central government and scarcely exercised their tax autonomy, makes the 
existence of vertical tax externalities very unlikely for the period being studied. 
7 Non-financial revenues are the income the region receives in the form of taxes, current and capital transfers, income 
from assets, and income from the sale of real investments (Chapters 1-7 of the revenue budget). 
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Table 2: Results of the estimates of tax potential 
 OLSFE SFA SFA-INCOMEIV SFA-INCOMELAG 
  Coef z 
Coef 
z 
Coef 
z 
Tax frontier 
INCOME 0.8307** 6.94 
0.8325** 
10.43 
0.6394** 
6.12 
0.8644** 
7.97 
POP -0.0557 -0.51 
0.3087** 
5.56 
0.3237** 
5.07 
0.2160** 
3.15 
STOCKP 0.1839 1.70 
-0.1503 
-1.79 
0.0864 
0.85 
-0.0572 
-0.55 
GAMBLINGEXP 0.0437 0.68 
-0.0482 
-1.33 
-0.0903* 
-2.17 
-0.0798* 
-1.97 
CAN -0.3661** -10.30 
-0.3847** 
-5.69 
-0.4298* 
-9.48 
-0.3969** 
-9.71 
DPROV -0.0089 -0.38 
-0.0293 
-1.57 
-0.0465* 
-2.09 
-0.0804** 
-3.35 
IP0911 -0.2469** -4.02 
-0.1517** 
-13.2 
-0.1581** 
-12.43 
-0.1816** 
-13.68 
TEND 0.0506** 4.53 
0.0379** 
11.85 
0.0282** 
8.49 
0.0297** 
8.56 
CONS 4.7971** 8.39 
8.7714** 
21.93 
7.9885** 
16.28 
8.6022** 
18.06 
Unexploited tax potential 
dPOLITCOLOUR  0.1141* 2.11 
0.0803 
1.45 
0.1352 
1.8 
dSINT  0.0537 1.29 
0.0622 
1.41 
0.0718 
1.3 
ACTIVISM1  -0.2265** -2.79 
-0.2557** 
-2.72 
-0.2676** 
-2.53 
ACTIVISM2  -3.11E-06** -3.14 
-3.30E-06** 
-3.2 
-3.63E-06** 
-2.95 
TRANSFREV  0.0005** 6.43 
0.0005** 
5.73 
0.0006** 
4.43 
PATREV  -2.1831 -1.00 
-1.1433 
-0.49 
-2.5578 
-0.87 
NFEXP  -0.0003** -4.1 
-0.0003** 
-3.67 
-0.0004** 
-3.11 
FEXP  -0.0006 -1.75 
-0.0006 
-1.6 
-0.0009 
-1.84 
DENSITY  0.0011** 3.74 
0.0011** 
3.45 
0.0015** 
3.51 
POPGROWTH  0.00001 0.01 
-0.0009 
-0.31 
-0.0002 
-0.06 
QMANAG  0.0015 0.98 
0.0022 
1.3 
0.0022 
1.06 
CRISIS  0.3753** 4.6 
0.3732** 
4.14 
0.3936** 
3.33 
GDPGROWTH  -0.01386 -1.64 
-0.0161 
-1.73 
-0.0289* 
-2.24 
CONS  0.0127843 0.04 
-0.0321 
-0.1 
-0.059381 
-0.14 
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R2 97.64    
θ  0.0683** 8.03 
-0.0626** 
-6.93 
-0.0700** 
-6.7 
σu2  
0.1359** 
8.52 
0.1414** 
8.23 
0.1549** 
6.62 
σv2  
0.0168** 
3.02 
0.0206** 
2.69 
0.0224** 
3.11 
Ηο: γ = σu2/σ v 2 = 0  
8.0876** 
491.17 
6.8523** 
356.12 
6.9141** 
290.95 
     * p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05 
 
21/2001. We also include a qualitative variable (IP09-11) which captures the years 2009–11, 
when in practical terms no Wealth Tax (IP) was collected.  
At the top of Table A.4 we have listed the SFA papers using these variables to estimate tax 
capacity. This table shows how we extend the explanatory hypotheses of potential tax revenue, 
by combining general indicators (usual in comparative literature) with other specific indicators 
of tax capacity which seek to show characteristics specific to our country or our legislation, and 
which have not been used to date in works of this kind. We tried including other variables (the 
unemployment rate, the weight of the agricultural sector, etc.) but they were not significant or 
did not improve the model. We also tested the regional tax fraud levels, based on the estimates 
of the Finance Ministry Union (GESTHA), but this variable was not significant either, probably 
due to the lack of an official estimate of suitable quality. 
 
Explanatory hypotheses of tax effort 
In taxation, the difference between real output and the output determined by the tax frontier can 
only be interpreted as the unobtained part of the potential tax revenue, but it cannot be 
considered a measure exclusively associated with inefficiency. Therefore, we have proposed 
that heterogeneous behaviour in the use of potential tax revenues, or equation [2], could be 
caused by several factors. 
Political variables: We think that each regional government may deliberately make a high 
or low tax effort. To take this into account, on one hand, we have included two qualitative 
variables: dPOLITCOLOUR, intended to show whether tax effort depends on the ideology of 
the party in power in the regional government, and dSINT, which identifies when the regional 
and federal governments are ruled by the same party and thus in harmony with each other. On 
the other hand, we have included two variables intended to capture the political will of a set of 
regions which have been strongly committed to exercising their tax autonomy (although we 
must take into account that the regions are left with hardly any taxable areas where they can 
apply their own taxes). The variable ACTIVISM1 identifies the tax effort of regions which the 
Order-α technique puts outside the partial revenue frontier due to more active behaviour in 
terms of tax effort (this can be seen in Table 3 of the section on results). As we have explained, 
partial frontier methods let us identify regions whose tax behaviour is atypical or super-efficient 
- in other words, located beyond the estimated potential tax revenue frontier, due to their  
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Table 3: Analysis of potential endogeneity (Wu-Hausman and Durbin)* 
Variable Wu-Hausman-F 
(Prob>F) 
Durbin-Xi2 
(Prob>Xi2) 
Sargan-Xi2 
(Prob>Xi2) 
INCOME 0.023399 
 (0.8786) 
0.024891 
(0.8746) 
7.21677 
(0.0653) 
POP 2.65872 
(0.1050) 
2.78252 
(0.0953) 
2.70662 
(0.4391) 
dPOLITCOLOUR 0.185597 
(0.6672) 
0.203905 
(0.6516) 
5.42109 
(0.0665) 
dSINT 2.11375 
(0.1481) 
2.31513 
(0.1281) 
0.456581 
(0.4992) 
TRANSFREV 0.781599 
(0.3781) 
0.858357 
(0.3542) 
3.23695 
(0.1982) 
NFEXP 0.7715 
(0.3812) 
0.844308 
(0.3582) 
1.00085 
(0.6063) 
* To test the endogeneity of each of these variables, we have used in each case the equation of the model in which 
they act as explanatory variables. That is to say, we have used the equation [3] of the text and consequently the TAX 
variable as dependent to test the endogeneity of INCOME and POP. To test the endogeneity of the other variables 
(dPOLITCOLOUR, dSINT, TRANSFREV and NFEXP) we have used the equation [4] and therefore the tax effort 
estimation as dependent variable.  
 
 
specific fiscal characteristics: either because the territorial distribution of some tax bases is 
extremely uneven, or because there happens to be an especially intense taxable activity there 
(e.g., property sales in coastal tourist areas), among other possible causes. These regions are 
Catalonia, Madrid, Andalusia, and Valencia.8 The variable ACTIVISM2 captures the volume of 
revenues from the region’s own environmental taxes, which is an unmistakable sign of the will 
to exercise the tax autonomy the law confers on the regions to obtain tax revenue.  
Budget variables: The region’s tax behaviour may also be determined by its budget 
situation, and so our model takes into account the existence of income sources other than taxes, 
and the spending needs of the regions. On the income side, we included the variable 
TRANSFREV, which measures the volume of income from transfers which the Autonomous 
Regions receive from the State and from higher levels of government, and which may generate 
fiscal illusion and thus lead to low tax effort; and the variable PATREV, which shows income 
from the management of regional assets, specifically, revenue from assets and the disposal of 
real investments, which may complement or replace tax income. As indicators of the will to 
exercise self-government and the need for income, we have included the volume of non-
financial current expenditure (NFEXP) and financial expenditure (FEXP), which will enable us 
to check whether the regional funding model has allowed a certain margin of financial 
autonomy, requiring greater tax effort from jurisdictions with higher spending.  
_________________________ 
8 We have considered the alternative of working with a dummy variable which gives the value 1, to the four regions 
mentioned (Catalonia, Madrid, Andalusia, and Valencia), and 0 to the others. However, this gives worse results, as 
there are notable differences between these regions in terms of their atypical tax effort (showed in table 3), which is 
captured better with the proposed proxy. 
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Demographic variables: We have also considered demographics with the variables of 
density (DENSITY) and changes in population (POPGROWTH). Population density can 
influence tax effort in different ways. On the one hand, a higher concentration of people should 
make taxation easier (Cyan et al., 2014), and facilitate the use of economies of scale in tax 
management; but, on the other hand, larger population density could also encourage informal 
activities that are difficult to tax (Mkandawire, 2010). Population growth rate is associated with 
higher inefficiency in the tax system because it is difficult to administer a rapidly rising 
population of taxpayers (Bahl, 2004 and Le et al, 2008), so the tax system may lag behind the 
ability to capture new taxpayers (Bird et al, 2008). Until 2009, the effects of the variable 
POPGROWTH may have been reinforced by the fact that the Spanish funding system set the 
population at the level of the base year considered, obliging jurisdictions with faster 
demographic growth to make a greater tax effort. 
Inefficiency: Regional differences in tax behaviour may arise from inefficiency in the tax 
collection and management process, which could be due to poor management, the use of 
obsolete technology, a lack of suitable human resources, corruption, tax evasion, etc. To capture 
this inefficiency, we have included the variable QMANAG, which we have constructed as the 
quotient between the non-financial current revenues the region really receives and the revenues 
it budgets for. Thus, the closer the real revenues come to the revenues budgeted by the regional 
government, and therefore the greater the value of this relationship or quotient, the greater will 
be the tax collection efficiency, or the control of revenues by the regional government, which 
will favour a higher value of tax effort. On the other hand, real revenues which are very 
different from the initially budgeted revenues could be a symptom of inefficiency in the tax 
collection and management process. 
Economic cycle: Finally, we have included the variable CRISIS to reflect the impact of the 
economic and property recession on regional finances and tax effort, and the variation rate of 
GDP in each region (GDPGROWTH) to see how the tax effort varied with the different amount 
and intensity of each region’s reactions to the cycle. 
The bottom of Table A.4 shows the SFA papers using these variables to estimate tax effort. 
5 Results of the estimation for the tax frontier and regional tax 
effort 
In light of the hypotheses described above, we used panel data (2002-2012) to estimate 
equations [3] and [4] of the stochastic frontier model proposed by Greene (2005). This is a time-
varying model, the True Random Effect (TRE) model (although the fixed effects approach gives 
similar results), estimated by applying the maximum likelihood procedure, with the following 
econometric specification: 
 
TAXit = αi + f(INCOME, POP, STOCKP, GAMBLINGEXP, CAN, DPROV, IP09-11, TEND) +  vit - uit [3] 
uit =  g (dPOLITCOLOUR, dSINT, ACTIVISM1, ACTIVISM2, TRANSFREV, PATREV, NFEXP, [4] 
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FEXP, DENSITY, POPGROWTH, QMANAG, CRISIS, GDPGROWTH) + wit 
Estimation using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) lets us solve the main problem presented 
by the conventional approach to tax effort through a mean behaviour regression, by avoiding, as 
Rao (1993) indicates, letting tax effort become part of the random residue. We must also take 
into account that the goal of the paper is not only to determine the tax frontier, but also to 
simultaneously examine the determinants of the regions’ tax effort relating to the observed 
heterogeneity.  
The heterogeneity observed in uit is taken into account with equation [4]. We include the 
efficiency determinants, zk, as heteroscedastic variables in the inefficiency function. An 
advantage of this specification is that it lets us estimate the tax effort function simultaneously, as 
a one-step procedure, with the parameters of the stochastic frontier. This technique has an 
advantage over the alternative two-stage method where the first stage involves estimation of a 
conventional frontier model with environmental variables omitted, and the second stage 
involves regressing these predicted tax efforts on the environmental variables. The two-stage 
procedure can lead to inconsistency in assumptions about the distribution of the tax effort since 
the estimates of uit will be biased by the omission of environmental variables in the first step 
regression. Thus, failure to include environmental variables in the first stage leads not only to 
biased estimators of the parameters of the deterministic part of the fiscal frontier but also to 
biased predictors of tax effort (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  
This specification considers that inefficiency may vary over time, and the inefficiency term 
excludes unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity. In other words, on one hand, it is 
assumed that any structural inefficiency can be corrected during the sample period, so that 
persistent inefficiency is not included in the inefficiency term. And on the other hand, it is 
assumed that unobserved and time invariant heterogeneity is captured by the frontier, and thus 
does not appear as inefficiency. Thus, all the time-invariant effects are treated as unobserved 
heterogeneity, and are captured by the specific stochastic term of each region, αi, which is an 
i.i.d random component. This means that the random effects model has two major advantages: it 
controls for any omitted variable biases, and it avoids heterogeneity biases in the estimates of 
technical inefficiency.  
The results of estimating the model above, for which we took variables in logs and used the 
STATA statistical package, are shown in the third column of Table 2 under the heading SFA. 
The estimated λ is the ratio between the inefficiency and measurement error variability (the so 
called signal-to-noise ratio σu/σv), providing information on the relative contribution of both 
error components in total error term. Thus, as the estimator λ is significant and very high, it is 
indicating the presence of technical inefficiency, and SFA is confirmed as a suit method for the 
study, in other words, the need to include unrealised tax effort, u, in the tax capacity function. 
Thus, approaching tax capacity through a conventional mean behaviour function estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) is not suitable, as λ is indicating that the deviations from the 
frontier are not only due to the estimation error, but that many of the disparities in terms of tax 
collection depend on the decisions made by the regional governments themselves, and on 
inefficiency. In fact, if we divide the variance of u by total variance (γ=σ2u/σ2ε), we obtain that 
98.54% of the error term is due to unrealised tax effort. Additionally, as indicated by Belotti et 
al. (2013), the significance of the parameter θ, which measures the estimated standard deviation 
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of the unobserved heterogeneity, validates the Greene (2005) approach, in which the unobserved 
heterogeneity of regions must be separated from the inefficiency effects.  
To determine whether the endogeneity problems affect certain variables (INCOME, POP, 
political variables, TRANSFREV, and NFEXP), we have applied the two-stage Hausman 
procedure and calculated the Durbin (1995) and Wu-Hausman statistics (Wu, 1974 and 
Hausman, 1978), which can be seen in Table 3.9 To do this, we have used instrumental variables 
such as the lagged variables and their variation rates, the expenditure declared by households or 
the weight of the agricultural sector in regional income. The output of Wu-Hausman and Durbin 
tests show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the variables, and the 
Sargan test presents strong evidence that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. The validity of the instruments used ratifies the Wu-
Hausman and Durbin tests. 
To make sure that endogeneity was not a problem, we also applied (with the command 
xtsfkk in Stata) a practical maximum-likelihood-based approach proposed by Karakaplan and 
Kutlu (2017) and Karakaplan (2018) to control for the endogeneity. Their approach, among 
other things, treats endogeneity as an omitted variable problem and adjusts the error term by a 
correction factor to solve the problem of inconsistent parameter estimates due to endogenous 
regressors (for a detailed study of this methodology, see Karakaplan and Kutlu, 2017). Also, 
their approach lets us check the endogeneity of the variables, testing the joint significance of the 
components of the η term10, based on similar ideas to the standard Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for 
endogeneity11. The results of this estimation can be seen in Table 4. The model that ignores 
endogeneity is named Model EX and the one that captures endogeneity is Model EN. It can be 
seen that the variable INCOME can present endogeneity problems (at 5% significance, η1=-
2.102*). Nevertheless, as the technique proposed by Karakaplan and Kutlu (2017) is robust 
against this problem, it generates unbiased results (Model EN), and it can be seen that the results 
of both models (EX and EN) are very similar to each other, showing practically the same 
variables as our initial model as significant, and with the same sign.  
In any case, as the proposal of Karakaplan and Kutlu (2017) does not let us simultaneously 
estimate the tax frontier and the hypotheses explaining the differences in tax effort, we have also 
tried instrumentalising the variable INCOME, which is the one which can present endogeneity 
problems (according to Karakaplan and Kutlu, 2017). To do this, we have used two alternative 
methods, which are conventional and the simplest to implement (Arellano and Bond, 1991, and 
Wooldridge, 2013) and which meet the conditions of consistency (Baer et al., 1998), which 
require alternative methods to generate similar distributions of efficiency and similar rankings 
of Autonomous Regions, identify the same regions as “better” or “worse”, etc. On one hand, we 
have instrumentalised the variable INCOME, just as we did for the Durbin and Wu-Hausman 
statistics, with the income lagged and their variation rate, and the weight of the agricultural 
  
_________________________ 
9 We ran a conventional endogeneity test through a linear model where one or more of the regressors are 
endogenously determined.  We did this using two-stage least squares (2SLS). 
10 Karakaplan and Kutlu (2017). 
11 To do this we used the same instrumental variables as for the Durbin and Wu-Hausman statistics. 
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Table 4: Results of the estimates of endogenous SFA in the style of Karakaplan and Kutlu (2017) 
 Model EX Model EN 
Dep.var: TAX   
Constant 5.918***  (0.955) 6.367***  (0.961) 
INCOME 0.837***  (0.217) 0.983***  (0.214) 
POP -0.051     (0.085) -0.062     (0.081) 
STOCKP 0.178     (0.241) 0.029     (0.239) 
GAMBLINGEXP 0.034     (0.090) 0.046     (0.087) 
CAN -0.372***  (0.058) -0.368***  (0.054) 
DPROV -0.014     (0.039) -0.024     (0.037) 
IP0911 -0.247***  (0.031) -0.244***  (0.031) 
TEND 0.050***  (0.008) 0.054***  (0.008) 
   
η 1 (INCOME)  -2.102*    (0.830) 
η 2 (POP)  4.824     (3.516) 
η Endogeneity Test  X2=9.5  p=0.009 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.1% (***), 1% (**) and 5% (*) levels. 
 
sector in regional income, and we then added it to our initial stochastic frontier estimation, 
implemented with the sfpanel command of STATA (Belotti et al., 2013). The results can be 
seen in the fourth column of Table 2, under the heading SFA-INCOMEIV. On the other hand, as 
an alternative, we added the variable INCOME lagged by one period to our initial stochastic 
frontier estimation, presenting the results under the heading SFA-INCOMELAG, in the fifth 
column of Table 2. It can be seen that the results obtained with these two estimations (SFA-
INCOMEIV and SFA-INCOMELAG) are very similar to those obtained initially (SFA), which 
would confirm that endogeneity is not a serious problem, and show the robustness and 
consistency of the model used. 
Focusing on the results obtained (Table 2), we can see they are consistent with what we 
would expect from a theoretical point of view, and with the available but scanty empirical 
evidence (e.g. Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010, Cyan et al, 2014, and Garg et al., 2017). Although 
the first instrumentation of the variable INCOME reduces its influence on the tax frontier – 
from 83% in SFA to 63.95% in SFA-INCOMEIV-, it seems clear that INCOME is the variable 
which most determines the explanation of regional tax capacity. As the variables are in 
logarithms, the coefficients provided by our models are elasticities, so that the results would 
indicate that when regional income increases by one percentage point, tax capacity rises by 0.63 
to 0.86 percentage points. This would be consistent with the fact that a large part of regional tax 
revenue comes from income taxes12. Other works (Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010, or Garg et 
al., 2017) have also shown this variable to be the most relevant in explaining the stochastic 
frontier. Population (POP) also plays an important and direct role in explaining tax capacity, 
with an effect of 21-32%, and the suppression of Wealth Tax caused a reduction of regional tax 
_________________________ 
12 The website of Spain’s Finance Ministry  (http://www.hacienda.gob.es/Documentacion/ 
Publico/Tributos/Estadisticas/Recaudacion/2014/Analisis_estadistico_recaudacion_2014.pdf) shows the weight of 
different taxes in the regional budget structure. 
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019–31) 
www.economics-ejournal.org 19 
 
 
 
 
potential in the 2009-2011 period. The model also shows the lower tax capacity (39-42%) of the 
Canary Islands (CAN), given the region’s peripheral and isolated nature, its adverse climate and 
geographical conditions, and the scarcity of natural resources. The fact that VAT and most of 
the excise taxes do not apply in their territory and are substituted by a regional-unique indirect 
tax, usually with much lower tax rates, may also be influencing this result. The single-province 
regions (DPROV) also show lower tax potential, although they can use both provincial and 
regional revenues. And finally, there is evidence of a growth trend (TEND) in tax potential, due 
to the passage of time and the learning process after the regions were given regulatory power 
over assigned taxes, especially from 2002.  
Although we have already indicated that the significance of estimator λ confirms that SFA is 
a suitable method for this analysis, we can test the robustness of the sign of the coefficients of 
the variables used to estimate tax capacity with the Driscoll-Kraay robust errors method (OLS), 
adapted by Hoechle (2007), which can be seen in the second column of Table 2, under the 
heading OLS. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are well calibrated when the regression residuals 
are cross-sectionally dependent, so this method would ratify the validity of the explanatory 
hypotheses of the stochastic frontier 
Our models also support most of the explanatory hypotheses of tax effort. Many of the 
results are in line with the available theoretical and empirical evidence (e.g. Pessino and 
Fenochietto, 2010, Cyan et al, 2014, and Garg et al, 2017). The variables which capture self-
governance and the exercise of fiscal responsibility are decisive for the explanation of tax effort, 
as are the regions’ needs for non-financial expenditure (NFEXP) and for financial spending 
(FEXP), although these last are only significant at 6-7%. On the side of revenues, the grants 
received (TRANSFREV) generate fiscal laziness in regions due to the fungibility effect. 
Conversely, when the region presents a solid commitment to the exercise of its taxing power 
or a desire to collect taxes (ACTIVISM1 and ACTIVISM2), the margin of available unexploited 
tax revenue becomes narrower, i.e. its tax effort increases. The model also reveals that political 
variables (dPOLITCOLOUR and dSINT) are not relevant in the explanation of tax effort. The 
management inefficiency proxy (QMANAG) also lacks significance. 
A positive sign for the variable CRISIS shows that regional taxes have acted as automatic 
stabilisers, a result which is consistent with the economic recession and property market crisis, 
and with the progressiveness of income tax and its relative weight in the total tax revenue. The 
negative sign of the variable GDPGROWTH would ratify this result, indicating that the more 
the region has grown, the greater is its tax effort. Finally, the positive and significant coefficient 
of the variable DENSITY indicates that there are economies of scale in tax management and 
collection, linked to the concentration of the population. 
Columns 3 to 5 in Table 5 present the calculations of the tax effort according to these 
stochastic frontier approaches. The magnitude of the coefficients obtained in these estimates 
provides average tax effort levels of around 88% by the Spanish regions, a result which 
demonstrates that in general, the tax behaviour of sub-central governments has been responsible. 
This allows us to refute the central government’s repeated complaints that the regions are not 
responsible in tax matters. This result is similar to that of De la Fuente (2013), and Herrero and 
Martínez-Vázquez (2007), and the results of the Finance Ministry from its calculations using the 
RRS  method, although it is far from the tax-room-to-manoeuvre of Medina (2012) and López-
Laborda (2015). 
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Table 5: Use of tax revenue capacity in Spanish regions  
 
OLSFE SFA SFA-INCOMEIV SFA-INCOMELAG 
Non-parametric frontier 
methods 
 
Order-
α(98)* 
Order-
m(160)* FDH 
Andalusia 0.9757 0.9094 0.9094 0.9173 1.3668 1.0350 0.9737 
Aragon 1.0661 0.9065 0.9065 0.9199 0.8865 0.8302 0.8268 
Asturias 1.0939 0.8293 0.8293 0.8650 0.8646 0.8648 0.8646 
Balearic Islands 1.2571 0.9224 0.9224 0.9305 0.9488 0.9493 0.9488 
Canary Islands 1.0681 0.8944 0.8710 0.9047 0.7017 0.6415 0.6319 
Cantabria 1.0550 0.8696 0.8696 0.8548 0.8945 0.8945 0.8945 
Catalonia 0.9959 0.9518 0.9534 0.9551 1.2137 0.9022 0.8471 
Extremadura 1.1238 0.7332 0.7385 0.7620 0.8445 0.8448 0.8445 
Galicia 0.9214 0.7873 0.7794 0.8369 0.9937 0.8750 0.8621 
Castilla-León 0.9506 0.8355 0.8293 0.8654 1.0210 0.8067 0.7707 
Madrid 1.0163 0.9403 0.9412 0.9332 1.5163 1.0693 0.9948 
Castilla-La Mancha 0.9145 0.7959 0.8632 0.8389 0.9106 0.8234 0.8171 
Murcia (Region of) 0.9731 0.8941 0.8847 0.9016 0.7594 0.7283 0.7242 
Rioja (La) 1.4991 0.8964 0.9073 0.9173 0.9372 0.9372 0.9372 
Valencian Community 1.0830 0.9424 0.9352 0.9417 1.3418 1.0360 0.9762 
TOTAL 1.0662 0.8705 0.8760 0.8896 1.0134 0.8825 0.8609 
 * Although it does not appear in this document, we carried out a sensitivity analysis of the efficiency indicators, 
calculating the frontiers as m = 90, 120, … 200 and α = 90, 95, ... 97. These estimates make the presented results 
more robust and are available to readers on request. 
Source: By the authors. 
 
To check the robustness of these results, we have also calculated the regional tax effort with 
the Driscoll-Kraay robust errors method and with some of the nonparametric frontier methods 
explained in Section 2 (i.e., Order-m and Order-α partial frontier methods and the Free Disposal 
Hull). The results are displayed in columns 2 and 6–8 of Table 5, and show that the average tax 
effort of the regions ranges from 86.09 to 106.6 per cent, depending on the technique used. 
These results confirm that hardly any tax room for manoeuvre margin is available, and reveal a 
highly responsible use of tax autonomy by the Spanish regions. As suggested by Badunenko et 
al. (2012), the high value of λ could mean that both the SFA estimates and the non-parametric 
techniques are good, ratifying the similarity of the results. 
However, all the cases show evidence of significant asymmetries between regions in the 
exercise of tax autonomy, reflecting the different territorial priorities at this level of 
government. Although some divergence can be seen in the results, depending on the analytical 
technique used, this disparity is due to the different approach underlying each method. In 
particular, the average behaviour approach (OLS) is very different from the frontier methods 
(stochastic or non-parametric), although these last are also slightly different, depending 
especially on whether they permit the presence of super-efficient units.  
Leaving aside the average behaviour approach (OLS), which the statistic λ has been shown 
not to be relevant to this estimation, we observe a clear consensus among all the frontier 
techniques used as to the jurisdictions making the greatest tax effort: Madrid, the Balearic 
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019–31) 
www.economics-ejournal.org 21 
 
 
 
 
Islands, Valencia, and Catalonia. There is slightly less agreement on the regions with the laziest 
tax behaviour, which we attribute to the inability of non-parametric frontier models to include 
dummy variables to control for the unique features of the institutions of each region. Murcia, 
Extremadura, and to a lesser extent Castilla-La Mancha and Galicia, would be the regions 
making the least tax effort, with some uncertainty regarding La Rioja.  
To analyse these tax discrepancies in more depth, we projected the situation of the Spanish 
regions in terms of tax effort, according to SFA, and per capita tax revenue, in Figure 1. This 
graph lets us classify the 15 Spanish regions in four groups, which are bounded by average tax 
effort and average per capita tax revenue. It differentiates between regions with especially low 
per capita tax collection because their tax effort is low -below average- (e.g. Extremadura and 
Galicia) and regions with low actual tax revenue but with high tax effort -above average-, 
because their tax capacity is limited (Andalusia and Murcia). Note that all these jurisdictions 
with low per capita tax revenue (zones I and II) are those with the lowest per capita income. In 
contrast, the richer regions show higher tax revenue and greater tax effort (Madrid, Catalonia, 
Balearic Islands, and Aragon). At the same time, if we look at the situation in these regions in 
terms of debt (Table 6), we can see how, on one hand, there are regions which, despite a very 
high tax effort (regions in zones II and III), have not been able to halt the continuous 
deterioration of their financial situation. Regions such as Catalonia, Valencian Community and 
Balearic Islands, which make a high tax effort, lead the debt rankings (Table 6), a clear sign that 
there are underlying design problems in the Spanish regional financing system. But on the other 
hand there are regions which, although they still have ample room to manoeuvre in terms of tax 
effort and revenue, have exacerbated their credit situation at a rate which is clearly faster than 
average (e.g., Castilla-La Mancha and Castilla-Leon), which would justify the central 
administration’s accusations of lack of accountability directed towards some regional 
governments. 
6 Final considerations   
We calculated the tax effort of the Spanish regions using different techniques which have rarely 
been applied in this field, giving us mostly similar results. Thus, this work is contributing to 
introduce new methodologies in the empirical field, and also to improve the few available works 
on sub-central tax effort.  
For the factors explaining potential tax revenue, the general indicators of tax capacity 
(income and population), the severe economic crisis, the temporary suppression of Wealth Tax, 
and the institutional differences between the regions (particularly in peripheral or single-
province regions) are determinants in the explanation of the tax frontier.  
For tax effort, all the techniques confirm that the regions have exercised their tax 
responsibilities responsibly, which would refute the central government’s complaints accusing  
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Figure 1: Tax effort (SFA-INCOMEIV) and tax collection per capita in the Spanish regions 
 
Source: By the authors. 
the regional governments of irresponsible tax behaviour. The variables capturing financial 
autonomy and self-government ratify this conclusion. The greater tax effort made by the regions 
that want to support more or better non-financial current expenditure, and the active 
commitment to tax collection of regional governments despite the severe restrictions on their 
taxing power, all clearly indicate an appropriate and serious exercise of their fiscal 
responsibility. The significance of population density demonstrates the existing differences in 
terms of scale economies in tax management and control. We have also found evidence that the 
design of the transfer system introduces perverse incentives, reducing the tax effort of the 
regions enjoying the largest grants. Tax effort was also reduced during Spain’s severe economic 
crisis, revealing a countercyclical policy which has been considerably influenced by political 
ideology, although this result is also consistent with progressive taxation. 
Nevertheless, results show asymmetries in the tax effort realised. Some jurisdictions (the 
poor ones) have a substantial margin for manoeuvre in taxation while others (usually more 
prosperous regions) are practically at the limits of the possibilities offered by the sub-central 
funding system. The construction of this map of tax effort lets us see that some regions have 
acquired debts despite having plenty of room to manoeuvre in terms of unexploited tax 
potential, and also despite being subjected to strict balanced budget restrictions. This reflects the 
problems of the system coordinating policies on loans, its faulty design, and the lack of 
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Table 6: Changes in the credit situation of the Autonomous Regions (2002–2012) 
Debt Stock/Income (in %) Debt Stock /Population (in euros) 
Regions ordered 
according to the 
Debt 
Stock/Income 
ratio in 2012 
2002 2012 
Average 
annual 
increase 
rate 
Regions ordered 
according to the Debt 
Stock/Population 
ratio in 2012 
2002 2012 
Average 
annual 
increase 
rate 
Valencian 
Community 9.7 31.2 22.16 Catalonia 1,652 6,998 32.36 
Castilla-La 
Mancha  3.1 27.2 77.74 Valencian Community 1,646 6,029 26.63 
Catalonia 7.1 26.8 27.75 Balearic Islands 740 5,522 64.62 
Balearic Islands 3.5 23.9 58.29 Castilla-La Mancha 436 4,865 101.58 
Murcia (Region 
of) 3.7 17.4 37.03 Cantabria 542 3,444 53.54 
Cantabria 3.2 16.7 42.19 Aragon 886 3,422 28.62 
Galicia 8.2 15.4 8.78 Rioja (La) 583 3,278 46.23 
Andalusia 7.1 15.1 11.27 Madrid  1,528 3,259 11.33 
Castilla-León 3.4 14.8 33.53 Murcia (Region of) 551 3,165 47.44 
Extremadura 6.4 14.4 12.50 Castilla-León 550 3,150 47.27 
Aragon 4.6 14.2 20.87 Galicia 1,167 3,014 15.83 
Rioja (La) 3 13.6 35.33 Andalusia 962 2,510 16.09 
Asturias  5.1 12.5 14.51 Asturias  776 2,505 22.28 
Canary Islands 3.1 11.8 28.06 Canary Islands 529 2,226 32.08 
Madrid  6.4 10.7 6.72 Extremadura 738 2,212 19.97 
MEAN 5.2 17.7 24.04 MEAN 886 3,707 31.84 
Source: By the authors, based on data provided by Banco de España. 
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penalties and suitable incentives, attested by the lack of a relationship between the financial 
burdens of the debt and the tax effort of the regions. 
For all these reasons, a legal reform of the regional tax system to raise the tax frontier 
according to the principle of financial self-sufficiency seems to be necessary in the short term, 
in order to respond to the financial problems of regions that currently find themselves with no 
room for manoeuvre in terms of tax revenue, due to being very close to the tax frontier. For this 
purpose, it could be desirable to increase the regulatory powers of the regions; facilitate their 
access to new tax bases - their own or at other levels of government; or extend their tax space 
with types of taxes that are currently shared, such as personal income tax. This would make it 
possible to raise the potential tax revenue of all the regions and correct the endemic financial 
problems that have historically afflicted part of Spain's regional financial system, while leaving 
the final decision on how to use this potential in the hands of each region. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1: Definition of the variables and their sources 
  Description of the variable Source of the information Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DEATHS Number of deaths in the region National Statistics Institute (INE) 23,512.13 18,779.18 2,615.90 67,675.72 
12w65 Total salaries from €12,000 to €65,000 
By the authors, based on Job Market and Pensions in 
the Tributary Sources, Spanish Tax Agency (AEAT) 
1.41E+10 1.29E+10 1.48E+09 4.80E+10 
HOUSCON Final household consumption of each region (in €) 
Regional database of the Spanish economy 
BD.MORES (Ministry of Finance and Civil Service) 
3.72E+10 3.43E+10 3.68E+09 1.16E+11 
RICH Total salaries over €150,000 
By the authors, based on Job Market and Pensions in 
the Tributary Sources, Spanish Tax Agency (AEAT) 
2.70E+09 4.11E+09 1.26E+08 1.76E+10 
STOCKP 
Stock of private capital 
 
BD.MORES 1.82E+08 1.66E+08 1.66E+07 6.01E+08 
HOUSEP The average regional housing price per square metre INE 1,664,413.00 489,678.30 739,037.40 3,271,030.00 
IP0911 =1 in 2009-2011, when IP is not collected;  = 0 otherwise  0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
GAMBLINGEXP Regional expenditure on gambling INE 1.93E+09 1.68E+09 1.95E+08 5.53E+09 
MORTGAGES Number of mortgages issued INE 74,882.32 84,220.36 1,811.00 404,875.00 
FINACT Financial assets BD.MORES 1,626,469 2,189,477 75,176 1.51e+07 
TAX Tax revenue of the region 
General Secretary of Autonomic and Local Financing 
(Secretaria General de Financiación Autonómica y 
Local - SGFAL). 
5.28E+09 5.19E+09 2.77E+08 2.06E+10 
INCOME Gross Domestic Product BD.MORES 5,138,756 4,884,390 536,084 1.70E+07 
POP Number of inhabitants INE 2,768,462 2,388,630 279,359 8,299,100 
DPROV 
=1 if the region comprises a single province: 
= 0 otherwise 
 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
CAN =1 if Canary Islands,  =0 otherwise  0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
TEND 
=1 in 2002 
=2 in 2003 
 6 3.17 1.00 11 
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… 
=11 in 2012 
CRISIS = 1 in 2010-12,  =0 otherwise INE 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
POLITCOLOUR =1 if the region is governed by a left-wing party, =0 otherwise Ministry of the Interior 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
DSINT =1 if the central and regional governments are of the same party, =0 otherwise  0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
ACTIVISM1 
= Order-α tax effort for the regions that Order-α places beyond the frontier (Catalonia, Madrid, 
Andalusia, and Valencia) 
 = 0 otherwise 
By the authors 0.40 0.73 0.00 3.39 
ACTIVISM2 Per capita revenue from own taxes SGFAL 19,330.78 32,795.91 0.00 160,925.70 
PATREV (Income from assets + income from disposal of real investments)*1000/population SGFAL 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09 
TRANSFREV 
Income from current transfers and capital transfers which the Autonomous Regions receive from the 
State or from higher levels of government, such as the EU (Chapters 4 and 7 of the revenue budget) 
SGFAL 1,463.28 835.79 -804.15 3,244.38 
NFEXP 
Per capita current spending represents the resources consumed over the year and necessary for the 
government’s activity. More specifically, it covers the costs of personnel, running costs for services, 
and any current transfers (Chapters 1, 2 and 4 of the expenditure budget). 
SGFAL 2,831.23 447.81 1,537.60 4,401.69 
FEXP 
Per capita current financial spending includes the expenditure needed to pay interest on government 
debt (Chapter 3 of the expenditure budget) and repay the principal (Chapter 9). 
SGFAL 133,601 147.3708 0 1,412.031 
DENSITY Population /surface area INE 154.64 178.04 22.34 798.02 
POPGROWTH (Final population - initial population)/initial population INE 10.84 10.73 -6.48 33.17 
QMANAG Non-financial current income received/budgeted SGFAL 101.43 12.05 80.33 148.57 
GDPGROWTH (Regional GDPt-Regional GDPt-1)/Regional GDPt-1 INE 1.12 3.78 -6.02 6.05 
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Table A.2: Correlation matrix of variables 
 INCOME POP IP0911 STOCKP GAMBLINGEXP TEND DENSITY POPGROWTH TRANSFREV QMANAG PATREV ACTIVISM1 ACTIVISM2 NFEXP GDPGROWTH FEXP 
INCOME 1,000                
POP 0,950 1,000               
IP0911 0,000 0,028 1,000              
STOCKP 0,993 0,956 0,047 1,000             
GAMBLINGEXP 0,954 0,934 -0,057 0,945 1,000            
TEND 0,010 0,045 0,581 0,078 -0,107 1,000           
DENSITY 0,620 0,456 0,024 0,594 0,564 0,039 1,000          
POPGROWTH 0,182 0,113 -0,421 0,157 0,284 -0,502 0,277 1,000         
TRANSFREV -0,327 -0,221 0,015 -0,328 -0,288 -0,269 -0,597 -0,209 1,000        
QMANAG -0,027 -0,058 -0,303 -0,061 0,014 -0,613 -0,013 0,287 0,043 1,000       
PATREV 0,191 0,153 -0,263 0,162 0,149 -0,164 0,145 -0,090 0,238 0,013 1,000      
ACTIVISM1 0,888 0,864 0,013 0,894 0,828 0,080 0,597 0,152 -0,427 -0,042 0,146 1,000     
ACTIVISM2 -0,276 -0,272 0,062 -0,267 -0,258 0,139 0,050 0,093 0,067 -0,105 -0,143 -0,293 1,000    
NFEXP -0,082 -0,065 0,273 -0,060 -0,158 0,274 -0,406 -0,332 0,636 -0,305 0,187 -0,166 -0,004 1,000   
GDPGROWTH -0,001 -0,046 -0,652 -0,063 0,080 -0,827 -0,031 0,513 0,267 0,444 0,204 -0,080 -0,088 -0,191 1,000  
FEXP 0,286 0,302 0,067 0,311 0,150 0,409 0,094 -0,318 -0,301 -0,186 0,056 0,371 0,009 -0,038 -0,369 1,000 
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Table A.3: General and specific indexes of tax capacity 
(Regressions using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors for the 2002-2012 period) 
 Individual estimates (by taxes) Aggregate estimate 
 IP ISD ITPAJD 
IRPF 
(income 
tax) 
VAT IICCEE TJ Total tax revenue 
Estimates of tax revenue using specific indicators of tax capacity 
DEATHS  5920.36 9.65      
968.2755 
0.02 
12w60    0.00014 10.14    
-.1202643 
-0.91 
HOMEXP     0.0368 14.43 
0.02056 
25.52  
.0765143 
2.04 
RICH 2.52e-06 2.00       
.0549367 
0.92 
STOCKP 0.3830 2.74       
29.51556 
2.86 
HOUSEP 82.57 8.69 
152.3004 
16.28 
337.6023 
4.19     
-178.8065 
-0.61 
ANUAL0911 -9.77 e+07 -7.97       
-1.00e+09 
-2.93 
PLAYEXP       0.05295 7.63 
-1.023991 
-2.92 
MORTGAGE   6976.109 6.21     
1393.307 
0.47 
FINACT   0.08607 2.94     
.1653496 
1.21 
CONS -1.09+08 -3.20 
-2.46e+08 
-2.36 
-5.65e+08 
-3.63 
-2.81e+08 
-11.91 
1.89e+07 
1.34 
4.99e+07 
2.93 
-3494809 
-0.74 
5.31e+08 
0.85 
R2 0.6723 0.7607 0.8809 0.8253 0.8611 0.9128 0.6608 0.972 
Estimates of tax revenue using specific indicators of tax capacity 
INCOME .0034 4.11 
.0042322 
7.76 
.0140434 
4.85 
.0409073 
16.42 
.0109878 
5.23 
.0028435 
2.44 
.0005747 
0.753 
0.07660 
16.29 
POPr -54.21 -4.19 
-47.69523 
-4.61 
-30.81779 
-0.82 
-275.2731 
-3.64 
251.4532 
3.11 
226.7382 
7.54 
29.94585 
2.60 
100.1408 
0.59 
CONS 1313950 -0.92 
5607628 
1.20 
-5.19e+07 
-1.81 
-1.27e+08 
-5.78 
-1.68e+07 
-0.71 
4428533 
0.49 
3912222 
1.50 
-1.80+08 
-4.16 
R2 0.60 0.8332 0.7123 0.8531 0.8597 0.9246 0.5659 0.955 
Source: By the authors. 
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Table A.4: Explanatory variables used in the SFA literature 
Variable Papers using each variable 
Tax frontier 
INCOME 
Jha et al. (1999) 
Ramírez and Erquizio (2011) 
Pessino and Fenochietto (2010) 
Cyan et al. (2014) 
Garg et al. (2017) 
POP Ramírez and Erquizio (2011) 
STOCKP None 
GAMBLINGEXP None 
CAN None 
DPROV None 
IP0911 None 
TEND None 
Unexploited tax potential 
POLITCOLOUR None 
DSINT Garg et al. (2017) 
ACTIVISM1 None 
ACTIVISM2 None 
TRANSFREV 
Jha et al. (1999) 
Garg et al. (2017) 
PATREV None 
NFEXP Garg et al. (2014) 
FEXP 
Ramírez and Erquizio (2011) 
Cyan et al. (2014)   
Garg et a.l (2017) 
DENSITY None 
POPGROWTH Cyan et al. (2014) 
QMANAG 
Pessino and Fenochietto (2010) use inefficiencies in collection with a corruption 
perception index. 
Cyan et al. (2014) use an index of assessment of corruption in the political system. 
Garg et a.l (2017) use crime rate, stolen property recovered by police, pendency rate of 
crimes and police personal /total population. 
CRISIS None 
GDPGROWTH None 
Source: By the authors. 
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